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Abstract
This paper aims to explore the ethical dimensions of Mary Zimmerman’s Metamorphoses in light of 9/11. With its non-sequential allegories speaking to the grief of its audience (involving the darkness of the racial Other), Metamorphoses carries strong cathartic power. Given that the performance communicates more on an emotional/imagistic level rather than a rational/verbal one, Zimmerman navigates the interplay of mythos and logos; the work sheds light on the competing forces of Self and Other as Zimmerman explores ramifications on the epistemological, ethical, racial and social levels. My analysis focuses the understanding of the Self/Other tension in the Western philosophical tradition—from Plato to Hegel. I would then introduce the challenge to this tradition, as seen in the work of contemporary theorists Levinas and Derrida, who suggest a path of "love" and "hospitality," offering an alternative route for present times. Wary of the Western epistemological tradition and its equating of presence (being) with knowledge (truth), Levinas reconfigures the primary ethical relationship and hence subjectivity. Such an attitude seems to inform Zimmerman’s work. Her deliberate choice of Ovid’s myths indicates a critique of the unitary mode of knowledge, understood as a logos-centered translation of the nature of reality, the epistemological mode that has dominated Western history. In the traditional quest for "wisdom," philosophy has emphasized logic and science, elevating logos over mythos. When logos is prioritized and mythos negated, this movement itself involves a dynamic of violence and favors a position of unity and authority. In Metamorphoses, with its allegorical stories and multiple outlooks, often producing a sense of enigma and mystery, Zimmerman challenges the privileged position of logos and suggests the viability of mythos. I argue that such an outlook can offer solace and comfort (and instruction) in the aftermath of the 9/11 crisis. My paper will thus conclude with a discussion of how this alternative ethical relationship (between Self and Other) may offer a productive frame for understanding the present and looking to the future.
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Popolitipov: “The heart is not progressive. […] The mind may make its leaps ahead; the heart will refuse to budge, shatter at the prospect. Yearn to go back to what it loves”.
Upgobkin: “[d]ialectics can only lead us so far, to the edge of what is known”.​[1]​

In this conversation, Kushner points out the dilemma of the Aristotelian proposition: that truth will lead to happiness, and that love of wisdom will lead to what the heart yearns. As the modern world is caught up in the perplexity of a variety of international political battles, racial conflicts, environmental crises, etc., and human beings busy themselves with more knowledge, truth and hopefully henceforth happiness, this consideration seems to indicate an epistemological misunderstanding—that truth will lead to happiness—that’s come down to us over thousands of years.
Addressing this, Mary Zimmerman seems to regard it as an ethical issue in her adaptation of Ovid’s mythos, Metamorphoses. That is, the struggle of different epistemological modes—namely mythos and logos— that galvanizes human behavior and fashions certain cultural formats, constitutes the nature of ethical relationship between Self and Other. The play poses a significant question: are human beings employing logos to proceed a linear progression and eventually reach God (eternal happiness/love), or are we searching love by knowing who we are through our relationship with God (mythos)?  My main interest in this paper is to explore the epistemological modes of self-other relationships in Metamorphoses, a performance communicating more on an emotional/imagistic level rather than a rational/verbal one, and how it can serve as an alterity to the reflection of various other self-other contexts. I will use Emmanuel Levinas’s ideas of ethics as a vantage point to better reflect contemporary issues on race, nationalism, global responsibility, etc. 
This paper is composed of three parts. The first part is a layout of theoretical methodology. This section will mainly treat Levinas’s reconsideration of the logic of the relationship between Self and the Other, and explores his ideas of different modes of epistemology. The second part attempts to contextualize the play within a post-911 world and explores the relationship between Levinas’s notion of rhetoric and the construction of nationalism. The third and final part offers a thematic reading of Metamorphoses that mostly emphasizes analogies between “capitalism (human civilization) vs. Nature” and “self vs. strangers” and how each can be interpreted both on an individual and a racial level.




… the concepts, a regular and rigid new world is built up for him as a prison fortress. It seeks a new province for its activities and a different riverbed and generally finds it in myth and in art. It constantly confuses the categories and cells of the concepts by presenting new transferences, metaphors, and metonyms…. (Nietzsche 254)

	Emmanuel Levinas is widely known for his calling into question Western egology, which he terms as the philosophy of the Same. Though considered to be an expert on Edmund Husserl’s ideas of phenomenology in France, he argues Husserl’s idea is trapped at the level of egology. That is, phenomenology fails to pay attention to the fact that “concrete life implicates ‘others’” (Purcell 23). Whereas all the key terms he coins or employs to describe the traditional Western philosophy is implicitly negative, such as the Same and Totality, it is important to note that he does not fall into the binary of this epistemological Self and Other. Instead of negating the existence of the Same, which grounds all thinking and philosophy, he proposes an alternative relationship between these two terms. As Adriaan Peperzak points out: “The reversal proposed by Levinas is not a simple reversal of terms, as if the Same, Being, Freedom, Power, Conscience, Greece, and Western culture should be swallowed and absorbed by Otherness, Justice…” (55). 
His contribution lies, instead, in contemplation on the logic of relationship underpinning the interplay between Self and Other. The relationship between Self and Other that traditional Western ontology hinges on is asymmetric, as the Other is often times reduced to be integrated into Self’s territory for its ends. While Levinas’ ultimate elevation of the Other and his foregrounding of ethics as the First Philosophy is played out in various contexts, this section will focus along the line of his reconstruction of varies modes of epistemology, as one of the most fundamental aspects of his contemplation on the logic of self-other relationship. This discussion of epistemology not only enables a better understanding of Zimmerman’s critique of the competing ideologies of Self and Other behind the brutality of 911, but also helps to explore the position and responsibility of contemporary theatre, as Metamorphoses itself shows. 
Levinas’s discussion of the logic of relationship draws from Descartes’ notion of cogito in his third Meditation, in which the meditator begins to ponder whether God is only a subjective idea or an objective presence. In other words, he suspects the Medieval ideology of an omnipotent God and seeks the possibility of human subjectivity. He attempts to distinguish those ideas generated by humans and those imparted by God within human consciousness. Such an attempt symbolizes humankind’s struggle toward adulthood.

I will now shut my eyes, stop my ears, and withdraw all my senses. I will eliminate from my thoughts all images of bodily things ... I will converse with myself and scrutinize myself a little more deeply; and in this way I will attempt to achieve, little by little, a more intimate knowledge of myself. (Qtd. in Descartes's Meditations [electronic resource] : an introduction 
    Wilson, Catherine, 1951-Wilson 78)
	
This passage shows humans’ subjectivity is reconfigured, through shutting down the senses and scrutinizing consciousness, as they strive to be, if not partly, the “author.” In other words, the existence of cogito hinges on figuring out whether God offers us an object for study, or just “dazzles us by its incomprehensibility” (Peperzak The Quest 147). The process of meditation brings Descartes to the idea of the irreducible Other, in that he relocates himself and God with the idea of the Other, and of which Levinas later elaborates and appropriates as the basis for his prioritizing the Other over the Self. 
Descartes describes the irreducible Other as “an infinite, eternal, immutable, independent, all-knowing, all-powerful substance, by which I myself, and all the other things that are were created and produced” (Qtd. in Peperzak To the Other 57). While Descartes enshrines human subjectivity in the cogito, Levinas affirms and focuses the eternal reality termed the Other/ infinity, which characterizes the traditional notion of God. The idea of infinity must be put into the subject’s finitude which, encompassed within the larger reality of infinity, cannot conceptualize the Other/God’s infinity. Furthermore, it is important to note that the idea of infinity is not the negation of finitude as it is irreducible and cannot be categorized/conceptualized/comprehended through any epistemological/consciousness means.
For Levinas, infinity/Other transcends human ontology and is resistant to the subsumption of consciousness. We cannot understand the Other through an epistemological mode because of its absolute Otherness and radical alterity. The Other only reveals itself through our relations to it. In other words, only through ethical language can knowledge of the Other be accessed. A question like “what is the other?” is an epistemological one that carries the violence of thematization,​[2]​ in Levinas’s terms, and is thus ineffective. (Peperzak To the Other 63). The Other’s otherness is immediately lost if an attempted epistemological categorization is imposed.
Levinas’s contemplation on the logic of relationship underpinning the interplay between Self and Other is the antithesis to the epistemological mode of the Western tradition enshrined by Plato. In the search of the “Forms,” where the highest reality lies, Plato condemns the images at which level mythos is nourished. However, for Siliva Benso, images/mythos do not disappear. Instead, they are reduced into the state of “Other” (as opposed to logos as self) in which they must be categorized and imposed on meanings. Benso claims “… the interplay of mythos and logos results into a mytho-logy in which the logos directing the mythos is the voice of the other which imposes not only the preservation (ethics), but also the institutionalization (politics) of the differences, alterities and incommensurabilities that constitute reality” (117).In other words, ambiguities under the imperialism of symbolic order (reason/logos/languages) are labeled negative, and obsession with the univocity of uncompromising rationality colonizes iconic representations. This philosophy frames forms of knowledge through which we know the world and within which we inhabit. Under the rule of The Same, in Levinas’s terms, mythos is edged out and a unity is formed. When the original multiplicities are split into the dichotomy of “I” and “non-I” (logos and non-logos) through the epistemological lens, ethical relations about the treatment (politics) of “non-I” become an issue that has haunted for thousands of years. 
Following Plato, Aristotle categorizes all things into the epistemological mode of knowledge as the way to comprehend and hence control the world. To fit every existing thing into established categories suggests a subjugating process that must have sculpted and molded the object into the totality of knowledge. As Nietzsche also describes human knowledge as a “prison fortress” that helps situate humankind in rigidity and regularity, and hence driving concepts that confuse the categories into the realm of myth and art, the idea of Totality and the process of Self-construction definitely imply violence (to Other). In a word, as Levinas states in his small essay entitled “Martin Heidegger and Ontology”: “The subject itself will constitute its own object” (12), he presents a cautious warning about the subjectivity being enclosed within “its own interior for signs of its conformity with being. From there, it is but a step to idealism” (12). This dialogue between “self and its soul” is dangerous in the sense that it situates itself within the chain of signification and imagines its own transcendental signifier (i.e. God) to justify or even glorify its own violence toward the Other.
The violence comes from that, as Levinas explains in his essay “Is Ontology Fundamental?”, because a being only exists when it comes into my comprehension (when it is enlightened), “I” do not invoke these beings but name them and possess them. That “possession is the mode whereby a being, while existing, is partially denied” (9) indicates these beings are under my power. The beings are not also a means or tool of me, but also an end in itself because it offers itself to me. Levinas argues, however, that “despite the extent of my domination and his slavery, I do not possess him. He does not enter entirely into the opening of being where I already stand, as in the field of my freedom” (9).  
Determining subjectivity and ontology only through the epistemological mode, for Levinas, will render “object” being contained into the system produced by the “silent dialogue” between the soul and itself (Levinas 1996:12). Defying the point that subjects are taken possession by vision, as chained in Plato’s famous Cave, Levinas asks instead “how does one genuinely reduce knowledge to existence?” (Levinas 1996:14). “The non-constitution of infinity in Descartes leaves a door open; the reference of the finite cogito to the infinity of God does not consist in a simple thematization of God…If to think consists in referring to an object, we must suppose that the thought of infinity is not a thought” (Levinas 1969: 211). On the issue pondering what is positive about this “exterior reality”/the Other, Levinas departs Descartes and raises the questions between being and knowledge. If the search for the conformity between being and knowledge, ontology and epistemology, or reality and consciousness, as Benso indicates, do not occupy the transcendental position, how alternatively can we view the Self and the Other?
	Levinas’s reflection on the alternative relationship between Self and Other, and its concomitant of violence is insightful, especially in the contemplation of oppositions in religious, racial, and national aspects. In the following section I will specifically focus on the construction of national subjectivity in the context where Zimmerman’s Metamorphoses is contextualized. 

Metamorphoses, Rhetoric/Discourse​[3]​ and 911
Staged off-Broadway on September 19, 2001 (Sommer), less than a month after the attack of 911, Metamorphoses accidentally and poignantly spoke about the problematic construction of subjectivity on a national and racial level. While here I do not intend to turn the discussion toward the construction of the collected identity of America, I would like to point out Levinas’s attitude toward rhetoric—as Zimmerman also demonstrates her attitude toward the logos-mythos relationship by setting up Zeus summoning “the paradise without words”—and how that could give a sense of the way national subjectivity can be impacted.
For Levinas, rhetoric demonstrates the violent process of reducing the Other into an object. As rhetoric often takes place in the locales of propaganda, flattery and diplomacy (1961: 70), it solicits the Other’s subjugation through not facing him. The interlocutors are not equal because rhetoric is a form of art aiming to address “a man of the multitude” (1961: 70). In other words, for Levinas, rhetoric as an art is designed to separate the rhetoric from the interlocutor. The addressee of the rhetoric is reduced into an object because initiation of the conversation is always contaminated and twisted by the addresser’s ideology. 
For instance, in Metaphors We Live By, Lakoff and Johnson argue how the rhetoric of “argument” has been structured along the metaphor of “war”: “We attack his positions and we defend our own” (my emphasis 4).​[4]​ In other words “we” (the Self) must attack them (the Other) and defend/delimit the boundary of subjectivity. Hence, on the ethical level, Levinas claims rhetoric—the art of the sophist—as an approach to his neighbor with ruse (1961: 70).
Looking at Levinas’s ideas of rhetoric at this juncture is insightful because it not only is pertinent to Zimmerman’s play, but also offers an opportunity to look at how “the American self” is formed and how the self, maybe in some senses embodied in Zimmerman’s play, reacts to the crisis. In “Transcendence and Height,” Levinas mentions the question of violence and Gandhi’s treatment of it.  “Gandhi treats the question of violence as the primary problem. On the one hand, he supposes…that the enemy of violence is not another violence…The I is not justified in imposing its liberty on the Other because it is not itself a valuable entity, any more than is the Other. You have posited the I as an entity. In general Indian philosophy, one posits it simply as a conglomerate of past experiences… not as a being which would have rights to oppose to the Other, any more than the Other has rights” (Levinas 1996: 24). 
In “Operation Enduring Analogy: World War II, the War on Terror, and the Uses of Historical Memory,” David Hoogland Noon examines the Bush Administration’s rhetoric for summoning the legacy of WWII to his global campaign against terrorism. Such analogies, Noon argues, “capitalize on post-Cold War historical memory and lend credibility to the war on terriorism, yet they characterize the world in a simple, dualistic fashion that evades a critical engagement with history” (339). By paralleling September 11, 2001 as another Pearl Harbor event, the rhetoric has been successfully extended to other WWII legacies, such as the Cold War. 
The rhetoric of anti-Communist Joseph McCarthy in the 1950s and its lingering presence in American politics​[5]​ may be a good example that explicates Levinas’ wariness of rhetoric and serves to lay out an understanding of chronological historical background which gives some clues as to the construction of collective identity. In “Joe McCarthy’s Fantastic Moment,” James Darsey explores McCarthy’s astonishing vital presence in American politics through rhetorical approaches. The reason why McCarthy’s rhetoric is “fantastic” is that his rhetoric is never followed with legitimate actions. If rhetoric is a signifier that leads people to a signified truth, the one McCarthy carries is definitely not the case. It is fantastic in the sense that it is itself an organic whole, a transcendental “signified” instead of a “signifier.” “McCarthy never insisted on a final judgment regarding those he accused. Indeed, his most common pattern was to make the accusation, then, when the evidence to sustain it failed to materialize, to drop the charge and move on to the next, leaving …only the horrible and often destructive stigmata of doubts raised and left unresolved…” (429).
This rhetorical phenomenon serves as another telling example demonstrating Levinas’ wariness of rhetoric. Rhetoric here functions as a floating signifier and its addressee is reduced to an object that can be appropriated into the advantage of the addresser, such as conjuring up a potential reality that overtakes the immediate one, in this case. That is, the Self/subjectivity invites the Other/the object into its own domain of a symbolic system governed by the Self. In Levinas’s words, the Other here (the addressee) is faceless, and is marshaled into the dominance of the Same. 
	Further, Noon admits that though historical analogies are fallible in one or another sense, we cannot think or live without it. “Historical analogies offers cognitive frameworks through which we might evaluate new information and experience, but they also trigger emotional, even subconscious associations that are equally capable of inspiring, attracting, and recruiting support for a particular political decision” (340). “Historical analog[y]” is a way of reasoning that appeals to logistic causal effects. In other words, it is the operation of logos that shapes our cognitive frameworks. However, the emotions triggered may very well be taken advantage of by politics. 
Therefore this timely production of Metamorphoses serves on another level as a reminder of historical analogies. Since the McCarthy phenomenon lingers throughout the second half of the 20th century, Zimmerman’s envisioning of “the paradise without words” emerges as a wary of rhetorical violence that Levinas cautions against. 

Metamorphoses
In this section, I will give Zimmerman’s Metamorphoses a thematic reading using the Self-Other relationship within Levinas’ theoretical frame. Given that Zimmerman shares the same wariness with Levinas about the violent treatment of the Self toward the Other, this analysis will pay particular attention to the transforming modes of “the Self” implicated through Zimmerman’s adaptation, and the types of violence inherent in it. 
Initiating Metamorphoses is the story of Midas, the rich king who wishes to be granted a “golden touch,” that offers insight into this human/nature and Self/Other issue. It also depicts the danger of imperial domination of totality. Donning Midas (and other characters) in a modern suit​[6]​ with a successful businessman-like tone helps to associate this mythological greedy figure into a larger context. In this case, I would argue, it is the embodiment of capitalism. Money is his/capitalist measurement of everything, and Nature/Other should be subsumed into this system. For example, when the drunken Silenus, Dionysus’ teacher, tells of a magic place where people live forever, Midas is eager to import whatever that magic is to make a great fortunate. When Silenus revels the answer is in the heart, Midas responds: “Oh, that. The ‘inner life.’ What uselessness…” (Zimmerman 15). The claim of “something useful” is directly translated into the working system, the way people reason and measure things, in this case the flow or accumulation of money. 
The encounter, between Silenus and Midas, itself renders much insight. Silenus is introduced as “a vagrant” and “most drunken kind” of trouble-maker in town, whereby exchange value dominates everything in a kingdom where Midas reigns. Midas is not much aware of the reason why he is cornering money though he seems to be impulsively chasing it. A drunkard symbolizes irrationality and an interrupting force in established social relations. Reprimanding his daughter jumping rope, Midas asserts his way of existence: 
		
	But you know, I never forget that I do it all for my [he can’t remember]…let’s see, all for my…it’s all for the, un…for the, um…the family. Yes, that’s what it’s all for. Family is the most important thing, isn’t it…when I get home at midnight seven days a week, in the moments before sleep, I realize that…um…I realize…what was I—? Oh yes, that the family is what really matters. (Zimmerman 10)

As the embodiment of the capitalist spirit writ small, Midas the king is like a desiring machine wherein his desire for gold is reproducing itself. When he is granted a wish, he readily requests a golden touch which, like capitalism, tinges the world with “golden” light, one dominant and in the imperial order of exchange value. With the lens of capitalist spirit, green meadow and red flowers alike now have their “golden” prices.
With this wish granted, the stage is first tinged with pastel yellow light, with its brightness gradually enhanced to a saturated one and the beam circumscribed to spot on the floating “golden nugget” of Midas’ daughter in the pool. The Second Laundress describes: “He went out walking and with every step, the gravel under his feet turned to golden nuggets…All day long he experimented…that the whole of the world could become his personal treasure” (Zimmerman 18).
Just as yellow light symbolizes “cheerful” in theatrical lighting design (Iacobucci), Midas is giddy, gamboling about to gild everything until his lively daughter, along with her jumping rope, become solid gold. The repenting Midas will have to pilgrimage with the audience is through Zimmerman’s artistic ritual to the end of the play, where he restores things to their original state.
The acceleration of the flow and accumulation of capital, an ultimate representation of the principle of the Same, is illuminated not only in Midas’ story, but also by the greedy and hunger-haunted Erysichthon, who scorns the god and “only look[s] for the usefulness of things” (Zimmerman 34). Cutting down a centuries-old tree beloved by the goddess Ceres, Erysichthon is cursed by the spirit of the tree in that he will “never get away with this” (Zimmerman 34), and is punished by the goddess. Ceres commands Hunger to reside in Erysichthon the brute’s belly and gives him to her “as a toy” (34). From this point on, Erysichthon is devouring everything, whereas even the money he earned from selling his own mother does not satiate himself.
		
NARRATOR. Baked shrimp and marshmallows, salami and ice cream, liver and doughnuts, everything in every possible combination. Even as he eats he is planning other menus and complaining of his hunger. As the ocean ingests the water from the rivers of the world but still is never filled and remains thirsty and guzzles more and more forever, so he calls out for more. (Zimmerman 37)

The endless hunger that leads to Erysichthon’s devouring of himself is reminiscent not only of Midas’s avarice, but again reminds us of the capitalist spirit of exploiting Nature and shaping forces of human desire and pleasure. In “Appetite”, Alphonso Lingis discusses how humankind situates itself over “sovereignty over all things” through appropriating and consuming other beings. “In taking possession of jungle and tundra...in traveling from country to country, being served like the emperor by every alien culture... any substance…is laid out for our consumption, each of us situates ourselves in the food chain at the top, making self…the cosmic dignity” (127). Eryschthon’s gluttony, however, is framed more as a punishment or curse that cannot be conjured away, and appears to be even more blind than that of Midas. 
Oread assigned the task to “Hunger”: “…go to Erysichthon and …and never to leave him until he is finished” (emphasis mine, 36). Unlike Midas, we have no way of peering into Erysichthon’s consciousness since he is caught by Hunger. If unfortunately he can sense his absurdity, though he is perpetually doomed to be driven by unappeasable emptiness, his story is tinged more with a wariness of the capitalist system. The greatest disparity between Midas and Erysichthon, or the transitioning moment of greed, is that the former was given a chance to repent when doubt crept in, while the latter was forced to keep being greedy. Being “automonous[ly] greedy,” as in Midas’s case and Erysichthon’s story before he was cursed, still has wriggling room for repentance because it is human will at work here. However, “forced gluttony” is funny, cruel and horrible in the sense that human’s willpower is kept at bay. 
Hence, if we contextualize Erysichthon’s story in ecological terms and outlook, the tragedy of being aware yet having no way to stop immediately fits into the human condition today. Through science and technology, humankind situates itself over “sovereignty over all things,” and is for some being proud and pretentious like Erysichthon when he insists in disregarding Ceres the goddess. Just as Erysichthon is destroying himself by devouring, humans are destroying their own habitat to sustain the capitalist system. 
The following story—Phaeton— continues this line of human voracity and the struggling of human will verses supernatural power. In this story, Zimmerman seems to envision a pessimistic view of the human condition. In the representation of Phaeton, son of Apollo, Zimmerman has Phaeton’s narrative, of a father-son relationship, take place in a psychoanalyst’s therapy setting. Making a Phaeton who wears sunglasses, goes to school, fights with friends, and talks to the Therapist about his birth as “sort of [a] one-night sort of thing” between his father and mother, Zimmerman ardently convinces us that (this) Phaeton is one of us. One day, Phaeton goes to visit his father Apollo, who has “the days and the hours and the century” as his secretaries, and asks: “…Give me the keys to your car. I want to drive it myself across the sky. It’s my turn. You promised. I want to light the world today” (66). Marching on like the Modernist spirit, Phaeton seems to embody the aspirations of human civilization and ambition. When the rein slips from his hand, which somehow corresponds to Erysichtohon’s devouring himself in the previous story, Phaeton falls: “You know, my knees were weak, I was blind from all light. I set the earth on fire…And it just destroyed me—you know, I was just completely and utterly destroyed. O-V-E-R. Over” (67).
While Phaeton is a modern figure, hence a product of logos, he is contextualized within the Greek relationship of the mortals and immortals. It is a time when humanity has not much control over itself and is a toy of fate/gods, as Pheaton’s mother told him: “hear me, my child. In all his glory, your father looks down upon us” (63). Moreover, as a mortal communicating his desire in a Freudian clinic to take over his father (an immortal), Phaeton demonstrates the process of logos (human reason/ the Self) usurping mythos (immortal/parental figures/ the Other). The therapist in that moment also helps us understand how the Self is born from a psychoanalyst’s viewpoint: “the conventional exordium of the initiate from latent to realized potential is inevitably accompanied by a radical realignment of his emotional relationship with the imago of parental authority” (65). 
The war logos (the mortals) waged on mythos (the immortals) dates back to Plato. Originally, as the Therapist points out: “Myths are the earliest forms of science” (67), both mythos and logos play their compromising, if not distinctly equivalent, roles as ways to approach the world. However, Plato challenges the oral culture which privileges images over rationalized written form, and subjugates the narrative of mythologies toward an educational end. The unverifiable discourse of mythos then becomes a narrative one that must be guided by verifiable discourse—an argumentative discourse led by logos. In How Philosophers Saved Myths: Allegorical Interpretation and Classical Mythology, Luc Brisson pairs “mythos/ logos” with “unverifiable discourse/verifiable discourse” and suggests that the latter term, namely “logos” and “verifiable discourse” of each contrary falls in the realm of philosophy. In this process, mythical discourse is not effaced. Instead, it transits from a dominating role to a subordinating role. “…[T]he traditional privileging of mythos over logos must be inverted, as logos establishes the measure by which the truth value of any particular myth is to be judged” (McGonagill ). Philosophy, then, becomes the love of wisdom and negating the original validity of mythological/imaginative narrative accounts.
Secondly, however, let us not forget that Phaeton is delivering his account in a psychoanalyst’s counseling setting, where irrationality/unconsciousness is the object of study. The counseling session represents the existence of unconsciousness and hints at the problematic propaganda of logos/modernity. If epistemology—how we know—is tantamount to ontology—what we are, humans should feel at home residing within the fortress of reason. That is, if we consciously follow the common denominator of epistemology, namely logos, we have already taken good care of our existence. But why is there still a fuss over the fragmentary and conflicting dreams (unconsciousness) which psychoanalyst experts believe can be helpful to our existence? This reflects what has been termed modern "subjectivity," in which logos/consciousness and mythos/unconsciousness combine to create ever-widening disparities between Self and Other in the representations of torn and miserable emotions.
Therefore, I argue that throughout the therapy session, Zimmerman voices through the character of the Therapist. Here she reiterates the theme that while the civilization incarnated in Phaeton privileges science/logos, it carries many incommensurabilities that needs to resort to a clinic for counseling. The forms of clinic may vary. As Zimmerman sets up a clinic on stage to treat “mankind” (Pheaton), this poses a strong argument that theatre experience could be one of the most important forms. The Therapist points out: 

…it has been said that the myth is a public dream, dreams are private myths. Unfortunately we give our mythic side scant attention these days. As a result, a great deal escapes us and we no longer understand our own actions. So it remains important and salutary to speak not only of the rational and easily understood, but also of enigmatic things: the irrational and the ambiguous. To speak both privately and publicly. (68)

Through condemning the modernist spirit where logos is privileged, Zimmerman ends the play by hinting at the alternative view of the Self and the Other that corresponds to Levinas’ inversion of philosophy from “the love of wisdom” to “the wisdom of love.” Through the myth of “Cupid and Psyche,” Zimmerman expresses her idea that only through “love,” through situating oneself in the self/other (human network) relationship, can our soul be found. “…The soul wanders in the dark, until it finds love. And so, wherever our love goes, there we find our soul” (76). In other words, instead of confining itself to dialogue with the Self, the soul wanders out from the territory of the Self and follows love, which hints at a harmonious self-other relationship. This is an attitude that echoes Levinas. 
	The three stories all come to grips with the self’s avidity to violently violating or even devouring the Other to consolidate its own existence. Midas’s eagerness for money typifies what capitalist relations are all about. The “self” of the capitalist spirit edges out other behaviors, such as familial ties and a drunkard who weakens production labor. Erysichthon and Phaeton are set within the context of human power verses divine/supernatural forces (gods/mythos), sort of echoing Descartes’ reflection of the delimitation of human’s wisdom and humankind’s attempt to be independent from God in the Renaissance. To want to be an adult and to pile up the fortress of “self” is not problematic. Is the self constructed of at the expense of effacing the Other ? This leads to the question of how do we define “the Other.” If as Benso points out, the Other does not disappear but exists in a different form subsumed within the realm of Self, is it problematic to call the Self “self”? Furthermore, would the brutal and rapacious “Self” finally gorges itself, as Zimmerman indicates in the story of Erysichtohon and is wary of? Phaeton is like Erysichtohon with a clearer consciousness that he is driving himself to destruction, and he is searching for the possibilities of a solution (psychoanalysis therapy). 
The epilogue of Zimmerman’s rituals is the story of “Baucis and Philemon,” an old couple who receive the strangers (the embodiment of Zues) with their hospitability. For this last story, Zimmerman explicitly indicates that love, the spirit of the acceptance of the Others, overrides everything. One night Zues and Hermes disguised themselves as stinking beggars to see “what people were really like” (77). Doors were slammed on them with people shouting: “Get out of here. . . I work hard for my money!” (my emphasis 77) This is a statement that echoes the theme of capitalism as the Self. Baucis and Philemon, however, appear as the incarnation of love bearing transforming power. They receive the two beggars/guests, whom they regard as “the children of God” (79), with extreme warmth and hospitality. Candles and meals are floated on the water surface, now represented as the “table” Baucis and Philemon set for their guests. As we are told that “Philemon poured wine from a bottle, but as he filled the glasses of the guests, he saw that the bottle remained full” (81), we know that their unfailing love consummates an unfailing supply of resources. The “water table” here symbolizes Baucis and Philemon’s love, and metaphorically both water and love nourish living creatures. 
Baucis and Philemon, as the embodiment of love, transform into two trees holding each other whispering: “Let me dies the moment my love dies”, “Let me not outlive my own capacity to love” and “Let me die still loving, and so, never die” (83). The three whispers, transcending from individual level to humankind as a whole, interestingly accords with Levinas’s idea. The first statement whispers the love between the old couple. The second and third statements indicate that the end of love is the end of “me.” As love indicates a peaceful co-existence with others, hence the end of others is the end of the individual. 
The play comes to an end with Midas entering fettered and shattered with his golden dream, “…clutching the stiff, gold jump-rope. Each of his steps is accompanied by the ring of little finger cymbals” (83). Toward the end of his pilgrimage, Midas drags his golden shackles to the pool of water, and the transformation ritual is completed with Midas embracing his daughter and symbolically restoring the human “relationship.”
Love that renders unfailing supply of resources can be played out in many contexts. From the epistemological perspective as the center, the self-other relationship is inscribed on the water ripple and radiates outward to various social relations, such as racial conflict, global responsibility and the relationship between humankind/civilization and Nature, etc. Attempting to resonate the spirit of love with the audience through the vehicle of theatre, Zimmerman attempts to converse with the audience by means of mythos and love, largely abandoning language and logos. 
For Levinas, “…a reduction of the Other to the Same by interposition of a middle and neutral term that ensures the comprehension of being” (Davis 40), has been the direction of western philosophy which should be reconsidered. Subjectivity is formed through a network of relationships, be it lingual, a human connection or the interconnectedness among all other forms of existence. Ethics is not a set of moral rules or the study of our behaviors grounded on reasoning. “Ethics is spiritual optics” (Davis 35-36). Ethical language lies in invoking the Other without attempting to “know” him or her through my epistemological lens, without the obsession of the meaning-giving consciousness, but with the inextricable responsibility toward him/her. 
For the audience that just experienced the brutal intrusion of 9/11, I argue that Metamorphoses, as an incarnation of a Levinas theoretical model, speaks directly to the grief and confusion of this time. In The Object Stares Back, James Elkins claims that Ovid’s idea of metamorphosis is to terminate all suffering and pain. In other words, it serves as a ritual transcending beyond the immediate reality. “Perhaps that is the idea of metamorphosis itself: it is a way of coming to terms with extreme suffering by fantasizing a world in which everyone, to put it in current terms, is a metamorph” (141-42). By the same token, Zimmerman’s audience also turns into a metamorph after they go through her artistic ritual. 
Through communicating with the audience on an emotional level, Metamorphoses successfully demonstrates the transforming power of theatre, community, ritual and simply, humanity as a group. It interrogates the site of “ethics” in a wide array of epistemological networks rooted in rationality. As Zimmerman appeals to an exigency of an alternative ethical model that should be let off the traditional epistemological hook and prioritize the self-other issue, she corresponds to Levinas’s ethical project in which war, demonstrated as a collected political consciousness, shall not reduce ethics into one of its rings. 
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^1	  These are the conversations from Tony Kushner’s play Slavs! Thinking about Longstanding Problems of Virtue and Happiness (Qtd. in Stevenson 758).
^2	  Levinas uses this term to refer to the imposition of consciousness to the object studied. He says it is “. . . not peace with the other but suppression or possession of the other” (Levinas 1969: 46). Noreen O’Connor has an excellent interpretation of this terminology: “The traditional task of reason is, Levinas claims, to ensure the coexistence of terms—that is, the coherence of both despite their difference—in the unity of a theme. Reason, in ensuring the accord of difference, without breaking the present in which the theme is held, permits both terms to be present as one signifying the other. Furthermore, the presence of the theme where both terms of relationship become meaning is the correlative of a conscious subject for whom subjectivity itself consists in making present” (62).
^3	  Levinas’s definition of rhetoric is rather a language tool the “self” employed to force the other into assimilation. His idea of “discourse,”, on the other hand, envisions a language system that is contextualized in his ideal ethics. In Totality and Infinity, he describes: “our pedagogical or psychagogical discourse is rhetoric, taking the position of him who approaches his neighbor with ruse. And this is why the art of the sophist is a theme with reference to which the true conversation concerning truth, or philosophical discourse, is defined. Rhetoric, absent from no discourse, and which philosophical discourse seeks to overcome, resists discourse (or leads to it: pedagogy, demagogy, psychagogy)” (70). Therefore, while in this section, I am talking about “discourse”—in a more Foucauldian sense—that constructs the national self, I am not referring to Levinas’s definition of it. In other words, the discourse of the construction of national subjectivity carries the violent sense of “rhetoric,” as Levinas defines it. 
^4	  They propose the idea otherwise: “imagine a culture where an argument is viewed as a dance, the participants are seen as performers, and the goal is to perform in a balanced and aesthetically pleasing way. In such as culture … we would probably not view them as arguing at all: they would simply be doing something different. It would seem strange even to call what they were doing ‘arguing’” (Lakoff 5). 
^5	  Both Arthur Miller’s The Crucible and Tony Kushner’s Angels in America reflected this as seen in the element of witch-hunts dealt within the plays. In “Joe McCarthy’s Fantastic Moment,” James Darsey points out McCarthy’s influences throughout the second half of the 20th century. “McCarthy’s presence was felt in the 1988 presidential campaign when Democratic candidate Michael Dukakis, in response to aspersions cast on his patriotism, compared the tactics of his opponents to the slander of the late senator from Wiscosin. . . In 1992, McCarthy made a return visit to presidential politics as the Clinton campaign accused George Bush of McCarthyism for his attacks on Clinton’s patriotism. Most recently, “PC,” or political correctness, has been denounced by its detractors as “McCarthyism of the Left” and the war on drugs as “chemical McCarthyism” (428).
^6	  Midas’ dressing is not particularly instructed in Zimmerman’s stage direction. But at least in Mark Taper Forum (produced in 2000) and Swine Palace production (produced in 2006 in Louisiana State University), he is dressed in a suit.
